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Strapped for Cash?  Funding for UK High Growth SMEs since the Global 
Financial Crisis 
 
Abstract 
While high growth firms (HGFs) are crucial drivers of economic growth, to date there has 
been a dearth of research examining their funding requirements.  Drawing on a survey of 
over 8,000 UK Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), this paper investigates the 
capital structure and access to credit in high growth SMEs in the period following the global 
financial crisis.  The findings challenge conventional wisdom about high growth SMEs in 
certain respects.  They find it no harder than non-high growth SMEs to access external 
finance.  The vast majority of high growth SMEs rely strongly on debt-based finance for their 
funding, not equity finance.  High growth SMEs are much less likely to seek finance for 
working capital purposes but are no more likely to seek finance to invest in R&D than less 
rapidly growing SMEs.  The findings suggest little justification for government intervention 
aimed at increasing credit availability for HGFs as currently espoused by the UK government.      
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1. Introduction  
This paper investigates the capital structure and access to credit in UK high growth 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the period following the global financial crisis.  
Firms achieving rapid growth in employment or turnover are vital for innovation and 
economic growth (Shane, 2010; Mason and Brown, 2013).  Research interest in so-called 
high growth firms (HGFs) stems from the pioneering work by David Birch (1981).  From a 
policy perspective the key attraction of these firms is unquestionably their prodigious ability 
to generate ‘jobs’ (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010; Nightingale and Coad, 2013).  
Consequently, organisations like the US Small Business Administration, the EU, World Bank 
and OECD have all been instrumental in propagating the importance of these dynamic small 
firms within enterprise policy frameworks (Brown et al, 2017; McKenzie, 2017; Welter et al, 
2018).  
While the literature examining the traits and characteristics of HGFs has expanded 
considerably in recent years (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010; Demir et al, 2017), research 
has largely overlooked their growth obstacles (Lee, 2014).  Finance is an important enabler 
of rapid firm growth in SMEs (Dobbs and Hamilton, 2007), allowing firms to invest in 
physical and human capital, develop new products/processes and reach new markets.  
However, the growth process is likely to strain the balance sheets of firms’, as expanding 
SMEs require capital for new staff, new product development or inventory. For multiple 
reasons, therefore, access to finance may be a particularly pressing issue for high growth 
SMEs.  Despite the importance of financial issues for SMEs to grow rapidly, research 
examining this issue has been “surprisingly scant” (Demir et al, 2017, p. 453).  Examining 
these financial constraints is pivotal for understanding the growth determinants of HGFs.   
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These issues also have strong policy resonance.  Increasing access to credit for SMEs 
is a core policy objective and according to the UK government accessing finance is a 
“disproportionately important obstacle” for HGFs (BIS, 2012, p.7).  High growth ventures are 
often strongly equated with equity finance (see Duruflé et al, 2017) which is considered 
“particularly suitable for growing businesses” to enable them to “scale-up” (British Business 
Bank 2016, p. 56).  However, to date there is very little recent concrete evidence to suggest 
these firms are either “strapped for cash” and/or rely on equity sources of finance.   
To examine this issue, the paper investigates the factors underpinning the 
applications for finance made by rapidly growing SMEs; the types of finance they apply for; 
the reasons for applications and the success of these applications.  The paper draws on 
cross-sectional UK data to compare how high growth SMEs compare to less rapidly growing 
SMEs.  We draw on a major survey of over 8,000 UK SMEs surveyed during 2007/8, 2010 
and 2012 and use a combination of descriptive statistics and regression models.  The data 
was collected in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) when bank 
lending collapsed1.  While there is strong evidence how the GFC impacted UK SMEs as a 
whole (Cowling et al, 2012; Lee et al, 2015), no studies have specifically examined how this 
particularly affected access to finance in high growth SMEs.    
Our results strongly suggest HGFs find it no harder than other firms to access 
external finance.  Therefore, the findings refute the “strapped for cash” thesis embedded in 
UK policy frameworks and suggest little justification for targeted government intervention 
specifically aimed at increasing credit availability for HGFs.  If enterprise policies are to be 
                                                 
1 Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) note that new loans to borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the 
financial crisis during the fourth quarter of 2008.  Furthermore, Cowling et al (2012) highlight that six months 
into the crisis nearly 10% of UK SMEs were denied access to finance.   
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effective and evidence-based it is important that the relevant actors are informed about the 
financial landscape facing high growth SMEs (Wright et al, 2015).   
The paper is structured as follows.  Section two examines relevant literature and 
hypotheses.  It then outlines the data and descriptive statistics. Section four outlines the 
regression models testing whether HGFs are more or less likely to successfully access 
finance.  The penultimate section discusses implications of the work, it then concludes with 
future research suggestions. 
 2. Literature Review  
2.1 Theoretical Background    
Information asymmetries are viewed as the main theoretical premise for the 
difficulties SMEs face when accessing external finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  In their 
seminal article, Stiglitz and Weiss outline why imperfect information makes it difficult to 
differentiate between “bad” and “good” borrowers (1981, p. 393).  In a world of perfect and 
costless information, a bank would stipulate all the actions a borrower needs to enact to 
ensure repayment of a loan.  However, given these pre-conditions are unfeasible, in 
equilibrium, a loan market may be characterised by loan rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).   
A core problem facing start-ups and SMEs accessing finance is their informational 
opacity (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar, 2004).  Owing to this, SMEs are often required to 
issue loan security but are often denied finance owing to their lack of collateral (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Comeig et al, 2015).  Scholars have also noted the increasing tendency by banks 
to use transactional lending practices using quantitative credit scoring ‘data’ rather than 
relational banking connections further increases the informational friction between small 
business borrowers and lenders (Berger & Black, forthcoming; Udell, 2015).  The rapid onset 
of “Fintech” is further promoting a reliance on sophisticated proprietary credit-scoring 
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techniques (Frame et al, 2018) such as digital footprinting for assessing the likelihood of 
debt defaults (Berg et al, 2018).  Owing to these factors, the notion that that smaller firms 
face credit rationing has become deeply entrenched in the literature and policy sphere 
(Cressy, 2002), despite mixed supporting evidence (Vos et al, 2007).   
2.2 Hypothesis Development  
Turning to the specific issue of financing for HGFs, prior studies typically suggest that 
internal finance is often insufficient to finance rapid growth (Michaelas et al, 1999) as most 
“have considerable outside financing needs” (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010, p. 54).   High 
growth SMEs are particularly likely to be innovative (Segarra and Ternel, 2014) and 
innovative assets can be hard to value which may lead to problems for SMEs accessing 
finance (Lee and Brown, 2017).  Indeed, the bulk of prior empirical evidence suggests that 
HGFs find accessing finance more problematic than other non-HGFs (see Table 1 below for a 
summary of empirical studies).  However, many of these studies occurred in the 1980s/90s 
prior to the recent GFC.  Indeed, credit constraints may have worsened since the GFC, as 
funding institutions increasingly re-oriented credit to larger firms, irrespective of their 
growth ambitions (Cowling et al. 2012).  This leads to our first set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 High-growth SMEs are more likely to seek external sources of funding than 
less rapidly growing SMEs 
Hypothesis 2 High-growth SMEs find it more difficult to obtain external funding than non 
HG SMEs 
Insert Table 1 here around here 
The literature on access to funding within SMEs often ignores the reasons why firms 
seek access to external sources of credit despite the fact this can have important 
implications for ‘valuing risk’.  Clearly, firms experiencing periods of very rapid growth will 
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require funding for different purposes to less rapidly growing firms.  Slower growing 
companies may need finance to aid cashflow and/or to fund their day-to-day activities.  
Conversely, it would be expected that growth-inducing investments, like research and 
development (R&D) and acquisitions, would be more likely for high growth SMEs.  The 
corollary of this is that less rapidly growing firms are more likely to be risk averse, perhaps 
using funding to invest in assets with guaranteed resale value such as property of plant and 
equipment.  This leads us to the following set of hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 3 High-growth SMEs are less likely to use external funding to fund working 
capital than non HG SMEs   
Hypothesis 4 High-growth SMEs use funding for riskier strategic investments such as R&D 
than non-high growth SMEs 
Under the ‘pecking order’ theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), firms are predicted to 
have a pecking order of funding preferences.  In line with this hypothesis, firms are expected 
to first seek i) financing from internal sources of finance ii) debt funding and iii) equity 
sources of finance as a last resort.  We would expect high growth SMEs would wish to 
maintain outright ownership of their respective ventures so in accordance with the ‘pecking 
order hypothesis’ we posit the following final hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 5 High growth SMEs will seek non-equity dilutive sources of funding 
3. Data and Definitional Issues 
3.1 Data 
The data for this study is the combined Small Business Survey (SBS) for 2007/8, 2010 
and 2012.2  All firms surveyed are SMEs with less than 250 employees, as defined by the 
                                                 
2 Note that in 2007/8 this survey was called the Annual Small Business Survey. 
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European Union3.  The SBS is a repeat cross-sectional survey commissioned by the UK 
government and conducted via Computer Assisted Telephone Interview. The questions were 
asked of owners or senior decision makers in each firm.  SMEs are selected using a stratified 
sample, with quotas for nation/region, size and sector. Within this, firms are randomly 
selected from the Dun & Bradsteet database. The survey includes firms across the UK, 
although weights are used in the analysis to account for oversampling of some regions or 
nations. 
For the purposes of this study two sets of firms were removed from the data. First, 
as is standard in the literature on HGFs, firms with less than 10 employees in the initial year 
of analysis are excluded.  Including very small firms in the measure would bias the 
interpretation of high growth, as it is easier for a small firm to achieve rapid growth than 
one which starts larger (for example, a sole trader taking on a single employee would be 
counted as having doubled in size although the absolute increase is minimal). Second, firms 
with missing values for the variables used are excluded.4 This is largely a random process as 
some firms are only asked a sub-set of questions in each year. This resulted in a total sample 
of 8,830 firms, of which 4,060 were sampled in 2007/8, 2,145 in 2010 and 2,625 in 2012 (see 
Table 2 below). 
Insert Table 2 around here 
3.2 Identifying high growth firms 
There are debates in the literature on high growth firms about whether to use a 
turnover or employment measure of high growth (Daunfeldt et al, 2015).  However, the SBS 
                                                 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-definition_en 
4 We drop only 291 observations.  
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only includes actual data on past employment (although it does ask whether turnover has 
increased).  Therefore, employment growth is used as a core measure of firm growth. 
A methodological challenge for the paper is when to investigate the financing decisions of 
HGFs.  Success in accessing finance may be endogenous with the ability to achieve high 
growth, as firms which do not obtain finance may not be able to achieve growth as a result. 
So we choose to consider firms who have achieved some growth and believe they will be 
able to sustain it.  In line with other research using this dataset (Lee, 2014), high growth 
SMEs are defined as those which have grown at 20% or more for one year and which predict 
20% or more within the next.  Of course the desire to grow is not the same as having the 
ability to grow.  As an additional check, firms which say that they have not achieved ‘growth’ 
in a further question are excluded.  While this is not a perfect measure of firm growth it 
does correlate strongly with actual firm growth measures.5  
This strength of this method is that it avoids the conceptual problem that firms 
which do not achieve external finance may not then be able to grow, yet there are two 
important considerations.  First, firms may not be able to reliably predict future growth. This 
may lead to a bias either towards optimistic firms, who are more likely to be seen as high 
growth, and away from pessimistic firms which are less likely to be seen as high growth.  A 
second problem is that by only using a two year time period, rather than the three year 
period used in other recent UK studies6, this may overestimate the share of firms which 
achieve high growth relative to other work. However, the advantage of this method is that it 
                                                 
5 The 2010 wave can be linked into the Business Structure Database which gives actual employment growth 
over the subsequent year. Using this method to test the robustness of firm predictions shows a strong and 
positive correlation between expected growth and actual growth of 0.8 (p = 0.0000). While these predictions 
will be wrong for a minority of firms, the majority of firms seem able to predict employment growth over the 
forthcoming year with some degree of accuracy. 
6 There are however significant variations in the definitions used to define high growth (see Henrekson and 
Johansson, 2010). 
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captures firms who are undergoing a spell of rapid growth, rather than those who have 
exited it.  Plus, analysis of the same factors using other data suggests the main results are 
robust using alternative definitions.7 
Table 2 shows the share of HGFs in the sample using this method. Of the full sample, 
just fewer than 5 percent are high growth SMEs (4.7%). More firms were high growth before 
the financial crisis in 2007/8 (5.4%), than immediately after in 2010 (3.6%) or in 2012 (4.5%).  
However, there was a significant uplift between 2010 and 2012. These figures are slightly 
below other estimates for the earlier periods: some scholars estimate six percent of firms 
achieved high growth (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009). This provides some evidence to suggest 
the results of this project are not unduly affected by optimism bias.  Note that the results of 
this project differ from other studies as this project only considers SMEs, whereas others 
considered all firms with ten-plus employees (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009). 
4. Descriptive statistics: Financing high growth firms  
4.1 Applications for finance and rejection rates 
Following Lee et al. (2015), a number of variables on access to finance are 
constructed.  First, applications for finance: HGFs are significantly more likely to apply for 
finance than other firms (see Table 3 below).  Exactly a third of all firms in the survey had 
applied for finance in the previous 12 months.  But 44 % of high growth firms applied. We 
use a weighted t-test to assess how reliable this finding is and it is statistically significant 
(p<0.000).  This provides strong evidence in support of hypothesis 1, that HGFs will be more 
likely to seek external finance.  
                                                 
7 It is possible to investigate the results here using a smaller sample of 1,300 firms linked into administrative 
data on turnover growth. The results suggest that neither use of turnover rather than employment nor our 
mid-growth definition of HGFs alters the main results. Results are available on request. 
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Table 3 around here 
Next, we consider rejection rates and the extent to which HGFs were refused 
funding. We consider two potential results: having difficulty obtaining finance from the first 
source, and being unable to get any finance from any subsequent source. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that HGFs will find it harder to access finance than other firms. Yet the results here 
suggest HGFs have no more, or less, of a problem accessing finance than other firms: 34% of 
firms who applied for finance had trouble, with 32% of HGFs. The latter were slightly less 
likely to fail to get any finance from any source (13 % compared to an average of 16% for 
non-HGFs).  None of these differences are statistically significant. Regardless, this provides 
cause to reject hypothesis 2. 
4.2 Sources of finance for high growth firms  
An important consideration is whether HGFs are more likely to fund their growth 
through internal resources, such as retained earnings, rather than through external sources 
of finance (see Table 4 below). In the SBS, firms which aimed to grow were asked whether 
they would fund this expansion using internal or external finance in both the 2007/8 and 
2010 surveys. This information is used to assess whether HGFs are more likely to seek to 
fund growth using internal resources, although for a smaller sample.  
Table 4 around here  
The results show that HGFs are particularly likely to fund expansion using a 
combination of both internal and external finance: 34% of them would do this, compared to 
24 percent of other firms.  This shows that HGFs are more inclined to use a ‘cocktail’ 
approach to funding, involving both retained and external sources of finance.  In contrast, 
HGFs are less likely to only use internal finance (only 51% of firms compared to 61% of 
others).  
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Note, however, that HGFs are more likely than other firms to apply for finance. To 
test if this affects the results, we also include the share accessing each type of finance from 
the share of all firms, regardless of whether they apply for finance (given in parenthesis). 
When considering all firms, HGFs are particularly likely to finance growth using all three 
measures. The largest gap, however, is that HGFs seem particularly able to look to finance 
growth through both internal and external resources: 10% of all firms look to finance growth 
in this manner, whereas 20% of HGFs do.  Internal finance is clearly unable to wholly satisfy 
the strong appetite for external sources of finance within HGFs.   
4.3 Reasons for applying for finance 
An important secondary consideration is that HGFs may be applying for finance for 
different reasons to other firms. Hypothesis 3 suggested HGFs would be less likely to use 
external finance to fund working capital; hypothesis 4 suggested they would use funding for 
‘riskier’ strategic investments than other firms such as R&D. This may then affect their 
likelihood of receiving finance. For example, banks may be more willing to lend to a firm to 
purchase buildings or capital equipment than to lend to one aiming to invest in R&D owing 
to the higher ‘sunk costs’ involved in such activities. The SBS contains data on a number of 
reasons for accessing finance, although sample sizes are relatively small. 
Table 5 presents the results of the breakdown and shows that HGFs differ 
significantly in their reasons for accessing finance. Indeed, they are significantly less likely to 
be accessing finance to use as working capital than other firms (36% relative to 47%)8, 
although a high share are still likely to be doing so. Many HGFs are accessing capital to 
invest in buildings or equipment. Hypothesis 3 suggested high-growth SMEs were less likely 
                                                 
8 “Working capital” is everyday finance used by a firm to pay basic outgoings, rather than finance used for a 
specific source such as investment. 
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to use external funding to fund working capital than non-HGFs. We therefore find strong 
evidence to support hypothesis 3. 
Table 5 around here 
Only a small proportion of high growth SMEs apply for finance for R&D. R&D 
spending is dominated by large firms, not SMEs, so this is perhaps unsurprising. Yet we 
might expect high-growth SMEs to be more likely to be investing in R&D than other SMEs. 
One potential explanation is the small sample size. Another is that HGFs may have applied in 
the past, with the funding application predating rapid growth.  An alternative explanation is 
given by Mason and Brown (2013) who suggest many HGFs use external sources of 
knowledge from customers and end-users as innovation inputs rather than formal R&D 
spending as their main source of innovation. 
There is little difference between HGFs and other firms in the share of applications 
made for buying or improving buildings (19%) or those acquiring capital equipment or 
vehicles (26%). Yet HGFs are more likely to apply for finance for two important growth-
related reasons: to buy another business (7% of HGFs, compared to 2% overall) and to ‘fund 
expansion’ (9% compared to 3%).  Both these differences are statistically significant. That 
HGFs are more likely to be buying other businesses suggests that the general perception of 
the increasing importance of external growth is correct (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010).  
These different patterns of growth create demand for a different composition of long and 
short-term funding which requires further investigation. 
Overall, this finds some partial support for Hypothesis 4, that high-growth SME use 
funding for riskier investments than other firms. HGFs are more likely to use finance to fund 
expansion and growth through acquisition but no more (or less) likely to seek external 
finance for R&D.  
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4.4 Types of finance sought by high growth firms 
Next, we consider the types of finance firms seek. The SBS asks firms who apply for 
finance what type of finance they seek, and a number of responses are given (ranging from 
bank loans to Community Development Finance). However, many of the smaller categories 
are only asked in single waves and can have very small sample sizes. To prevent this from 
biasing the results, only seven base categories of finance are considered: bank loans; bank 
overdrafts; venture capital; grant, leasing and hire purchase; loans from family / business 
partners / directors, and; mortgages for property purchases / improvements.    
 As shown in Table 4, the most common type of finance applied for is a bank 
loan (40% of firms in the sample). Forty nine percent of HGFs applied for bank loans 
compared to 39% of other firms (this difference is statistically significant). The second most 
common form of finance is bank overdrafts, which 26% of firms apply for.  However, in this 
case HGFs are significantly less likely to apply (18% compared to 27%).  This may reflect the 
greater reliance on working capital rather than growth finance for non-high growth SMEs. 
Hypothesis 5 suggested that HGFs were more likely to seek non-equity dilutive 
finance. This appears to be supported to some degree, as they are more likely to apply for 
bank loans than other firms. Yet because a far higher share utilise venture capital than non-
HGFs, albeit a small overall proportion (<5%), the hypothesis does seem to be contestable 
up to a point. 
5. Model and estimation strategy 
5.1 Empirical Model 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 both considered the extent to which HGFs applied for finance 
and their likelihood of rejection. To test whether these results are driven by their status as 
HGFs, or the other characteristics of firms which are likely to achieve high growth, a set of 
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probit regression models are estimated. These estimate the likelihood of firms finding it 
hard to access finance as a function of both high-growth status and other variables such as 
size, sector and age. 
Our methodology develops from contributions such as Fraser (2009) in using simple 
probit models alongside Heckman selection models to investigate this research question 
(see also Mina et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2015). The basic model is as follows: 
FINANCEi = α + β1 GROWTHi + β2 FIRMi + β3 OWNERi + β4 YEARi + φi + ε  (1) 
For firm ‘i’. Where ‘FINANCE’ is one of a series of variables for difficulty in obtaining finance 
(as outlined in table 2 and 3), α is the constant, ‘GROWTH’ is whether the firm is undergoing 
high growth, FIRM is a series of firm level characteristics such as size and age, OWNER is the 
characteristics and qualifications of the owner or management team, φ are sectoral controls 
and ε is the error term. 
The estimation method takes two forms. First, simple probit regression results are 
estimated.9 However, a complication is that certain firms are more likely to apply for 
finance, and this may be correlated. To address this in a second set of models selection 
effects are controlled for, and estimate a two-stage heckman probit regression. This 
requires a variable to be included in the selection equation (which estimates the probability 
of applying for finance) but not in the basic regression (which estimates likelihood of 
problems obtaining finance, corrected for the likelihood of applying). Legal status is used as 
the selection variable. 
5.2 Control variables 
                                                 
9 Note we also conduct robustness tests using logit and OLS models with the same specification. These seem to 
make little difference to the main results. Results available on request. 
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Other factors may influence the ability of firms to access finance or not. To ensure 
these are not affecting the link between HGFs and access to finance, the model controls for 
a series of other potential explanatory variables10. 
First, the sample of firms spans a 5-year time period which included both major 
economic change and significant variation in the supply of credit.  Bank lending tightened 
considerably following the financial crisis which began in 2008 (Cowling et al. 2012). To 
control for this cyclical effect, two binary variables are used which take the number one if a 
firm is sampled in 2010 or 2012. The reference category is before the recession (2007/8) 
and so we expect both variables to be positive. 
Size will also be an important determinant of lending decisions (Cowling et al. 2012). 
Larger firms will often represent safer investments, and size is sometimes used a proxy for 
risk by banks. Because of this, we expect larger firms to be better able to access finance. The 
model controls for this using three size dummies, based on total employment in the year 
before the survey. 
Similarly, age will be important for firms. Older firms will have longer-track records 
and so seem a ‘safer bet’ for investors. Two dummy variables (which take the value 0 or 1) 
are used to account for this, whether firms are 5-9 years old, or 10 +. The reference category 
is young firms under five years old, and we expect each dummy variable to be positively 
related to difficulties accessing finance. 
Entrepreneur characteristics and access to credit have been a controversial area of 
research. Because banks often make decisions based on firm size, age and balance sheets, 
rather than the characteristics of entrepreneurs, it might be argued that this is unimportant. 
                                                 
10 We control for factors such as size, age and aim to grow.  Unfortunately, however, we could not control for 
levels of collateral due to a lack of appropriate questions in the survey examined.  
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Research on whether ethnic minorities find it harder to access finance supports this 
interpretation and finds less impact (Fraser, 2009). Our model controls for three 
entrepreneur characteristics: whether firms are female-led, ethnicity and whether the 
entrepreneur has a qualification. We expect positive signs on the first two but, as human 
capital is important for entrepreneurial success, the latter to have a negative impact. 
An additional variable for entrepreneurial human capital is the number of directors. Where 
firms have more directors, and so more experience, contacts and knowledge, they may be 
better able to access finance.11  
The growth ambitions of a company may also be important and a variable for 
whether firms aim to grow is included. Clearly, aiming to grow is likely to be positively 
related to applications for finance. Firms which aim to grow will, on the one hand, make 
more ambitious applications, yet they may also have better business plans and/or more 
attractive financial projections. Because of this, the sign of the coefficient is ambiguous. 
Seeking advice before applying is also likely to be crucial in helping firms access finance 
(Rostamkalaei and Freel, 2017). We include a variable for this, which we expect to be 
negatively related to rejection rates.  
Finally, two legal dummies for whether a firm is a partnership or a limited company 
are included. Past research has shown a link between legal structure and applications for 
finance, but shows little relationship with the success of applications (Mina et al. 2013). 
Consequently, this is included in regressions controlling for selection bias as the ‘selection 
variable’ 
5.3 Results  
                                                 
11 We also consider potential non-linearities in the number of directors using a quadratic term or dummy 
variables for different sizes. But these suggest that the relationship is linear. 
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The basic models for access to finance are included in Table 6.12  The first set of 
models (1 – 3) are estimated as simple probit regressions, without controlling for selection. 
For ease of interpretation, we present marginal effects. The next (models 4 – 5) use the 
standard Heckman correction for selection effects. 
Table 6 around here 
Column one gives the results for whether firms apply for finance. They show that 
HGFs are around 7 percent more likely to apply for finance than other firms, a finding which 
is statistically significant. This reflects the descriptive statistics presented earlier, which 
showed no reason to reject the hypothesis that HGFs will be more likely to seek external 
finance than other firms. 
The results also suggest other drivers of finance applications. As expected, firms 
which aim to grow are considerably more likely to apply for finance.  Firms with qualified 
owners are also more likely to apply for finance, a finding which reflects a large literature on 
this topic, and the fact that qualified owners are more likely to help achieve firm growth 
(Barringer et al, 2005). Multiple directors may be a proxy for more systematic top 
management teams.  Larger firms are also more likely to apply for finance, although age 
does not appear alter matters.  
Columns two and three consider whether applications are successful. We find 
limited evidence that HGFs are more likely to find it difficult to access finance – the 
coefficient is statistically significant but only at the 10% level. In terms of absolute credit 
rationing, despite their increased likelihood of applying, HGFs are no more or less likely than 
other firms to find they are unable to access finance altogether.  
                                                 
12 Note that we also run some tests for multicollinearity. These show no significant problems (e.g. the mean 
variance inflation factors run between 2.23 – 3.1, far below the accepted level of 7 for a problem).  
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Other factors are also important in determining success of applications for finance. It 
is clear that the credit crunch worsened conditions. Controlling for recent growth, firm and 
owner characteristics, firms in 2010 were over five percent more likely to say they had 
difficulty obtaining finance than those in 2007/8.  Size is also important. Applications made 
by larger firms are more likely to be successful, perhaps reflecting an increased use of 
company scale as a risk metric by firms and/or greater levels of collateral (Cowling et al. 
2012).  And there is some evidence that older firms are less likely to be rejected. Neither 
ethnicity or gender seems to matter once selection effects are accounted for.   
In columns 4 and 5, the models control for selection and the likelihood of firms 
applying for finance. Note that the first stage selection equation is reported in the appendix 
- this is essentially the same as the regression for applications presented in column 1. When 
controlling for selection effects, HGFs actually appear to find it no easier or harder to access 
finance. These results are presented graphically in Figure 1 which shows the magnitude of 
the main effects we are interested in, with confidence intervals. Overall, these results run 
counter to Hypothesis 2: that high growth SMEs find it more difficult to obtain external 
finance than other firms. Contrary to expectations, there is no penalty detected for rapid 
firm growth when applying for finance. 
 
Insert figure 1 around here 
 
As with the simple regression models, even controlling for a changed probability of 
applying for finance, it was harder for firms to obtain finance after the recession. Size is 
particularly important though, and larger firms are more likely to obtain finance. Controlling 
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for their size, firms operating from multiple sites are also less likely to find it easier to access 
finance.  
6.  Discussion  
The empirical findings reported contribute to the growing literatures on access to 
finance and high growth SMEs.  The work revealed that HGFs are significantly (i.e. 9%) more 
likely to apply for finance than other SMEs.  This corroborates previous research showing 
external finance to be a fundamental part of the growth process for rapidly growing firms 
(Vos et al, 2007; Vanacker and Manigart, 2010).  Again resonating with other recent 
research examining HGFs, an interesting finding was the prevalence of debt financing within 
high growth SMEs (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010).  This emphasis on non-equity dilutive 
sources of funding within HGFs is consistent with the ‘pecking order hypothesis’ (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) and may hinge on the strong desire by entrepreneurs to retain full control of 
their respective business.  However, this seems to contrast sharply with the strong belief by 
policy makers that equity finance is crucial for HGFs (Brown et al, 2017).   
A less expected finding was that high-growth SMEs do not encounter greater 
problems accessing finance than typical SMEs.  Therefore, in spite of being innovative and 
riskier firms and more likely to apply for finance they are no more likely to encounter 
problems obtaining finance.  This suggests that following the GFC banks did not discriminate 
against high growth SMEs by denying them credit.  However, some other recent research 
suggests that rapidly growing smaller firms may be penalised by higher borrowing costs 
(Rostamkalaei and Freel, 2016) which may partly explain their parity with non-HGFs in terms 
of being able to obtain finance.  Cash generative HGFs are presumably more able to service 
debt less rapidly growing firms cannot which may also explain the willingness of banks to 
lend to these firms, albeit on less preferable terms.  Even during the depths of the recent 
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recessionary period covered by the data, our results are consistent with pre-GFC research 
showing that there is no discernible ‘funding gap’ for growth-oriented firms (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996; Vos et al, 2007).        
The results also augment our knowledge of ‘how’ high-growth SMEs grow.  Previous 
work on HGFs has mostly examined ‘how much’ firms grow rather than ‘how’ growth occurs 
(McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010).  By examining the reasons for accessing funding, it revealed 
clear differences between high and low growth SMEs.  HGFs are much less likely to seek 
finance for working capital purposes.  The research also found support demonstrating the 
greater propensity for HGFs to seek finance for riskier strategic investments such as 
acquisitions.  Surprisingly, investment in R&D seemed of equal importance to high and low 
growth SMEs. This infers that the construction of “innovativeness” within these firms hinges 
on more than R&D expenditure within rapidly growing SMEs (Mason and Brown, 2013).   
The findings clearly have implications for public policy.  Some authors have noted 
that while a consensus exists that HGFs are an important stimulus of economic growth, 
these positive attributes alone do not provide a rationale for policy intervention 
(Nightingale and Coad, 2013).  Indeed, the findings suggest little justification for government 
intervention aimed at increasing credit availability for HGFs as currently espoused by the UK 
government.  If anything, the findings provide further grounds to question the primacy of 
HGFs within policy frameworks (Satterthwaite and Hamilton, 2017).   
7. Conclusion  
While HGFs are crucial drivers of innovation and economic growth there has been a 
dearth of research examining their funding requirements.  To address this gap, this paper 
empirically examined the financial affairs of 8,830 SMEs interviewed as part of the UK’s 
Small Business Survey.  This novel research unearthed some key insights which contribute to 
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the growing literature on access to finance in SMEs and high growth.  Importantly, the 
findings also challenge the perceptions of HGFs within the policy sphere.   
In line with the pecking order thesis, high growth SMEs predominantly rely on 
traditional sources of debt-based finance, not equity finance. The work therefore challenges 
the overwhelming policy emphasis advocated by some (Duruflé et al, 2017) on developing 
equity funding as a means of promoting high growth ventures.  Despite their strong appetite 
for external finance, our results strongly suggest they find it no harder than other firms to 
access external finance, refuting the “strapped for cash” thesis embedded in UK policy 
frameworks.  A key inference is that policy makers may be better served improving credit 
availability in smaller firms with growth “potential” rather than supporting those already 
undertaking rapid growth.    
As ever, this work has limitations further research could help remedy.  While our 
cross-sectional data provides insights into firm behaviour at certain periods in time, a useful 
extension would be to use longitudinal data to better control for firm performance and the 
dynamic relationships between funding and growth.  To date, past work on credit 
constraints in high growth SMEs has predominantly (but not exclusively) been UK focused, 
so work on these issues in other spatial contexts clearly merits closer attention.  Given their 
central role as drivers of economic growth, we hope this paper stimulates further research 
examining the capital structure and financial requirements of high growth SMEs.   
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